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Abstract
In their seminal 1985 paper, Katz and Shapiro study systems compatibility in set-
tings with one-sided platforms and direct network externalities. We consider systems
compatibility when competing platforms are two-sided and there are indirect network
externalities to develop an explanation why markets with two-sided platforms are often
characterized by incompatibility with one dominant player who may subsidize access
to one side of the market. Specifically, we model competitive interaction between two
providers of horizontally differentiated platforms that act as intermediaries between de-
velopers of platform-based products (applications) and users of such products. We find
that the unique equilibrium under platform compatibility leads to higher profits than
the symmetric equilibrium under incompatibility. Notwithstanding, incompatibility
naturally gives rise to asymmetric equilibria with a dominant platform that captures
all users and earns more than under compatibility. Our model allows a detailed analysis
of social efficiency. We find that entry by developers is socially excessive (insufficient) if
competing platforms are compatible (incompatible) and that incompatibility generates
larger total welfare than compatibility when horizontal differences between platforms
are small.
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1 Introduction
The last three decades have witnessed unprecedented growth in network industries such as
video games, computers, credit cards, media, or telecommunications. These industries are
often organized around physical or virtual platforms that enable distinct groups of agents
to interact with one another and are commonly referred to as two-sided markets or markets
with two-sided platforms (Evans, 2003, and Evans and Schmalensee, 2007). An operating
systems developer such as Microsoft, for example, provides a software platform that makes
possible the completion of value-creating transactions between independent software vendors
and users.
It is now well-known that platforms are characterized by the presence of inter-group
network externalities and that these constitute a central feature affecting pricing by platform
providers. For example, when pricing its operating systems and software development kits,
Microsoft must take into account that the larger the number of applications expected to
run on Windows, the more willing users are to adopt it. Likewise, developers’ incentives to
write Windows applications grow with the number of users who are expected to adopt that
operating system.
A key attribute of these markets that determines the intensity and scope of network
externalities is whether competing platforms are compatible or not. In a seminal paper,
Katz and Shapiro (1985) study systems compatibility in markets with one-sided platforms.1
The literature on markets with two-sided platforms, however, has largely ignored the effects
of platform (in)compatibility on market outcomes, which constitutes the focus of our paper.
The contribution of this paper is to develop an explanation of why markets with two-
sided platforms are often characterized by incompatibility with one dominant player who
may choose to subsidize access to one side of the market. Prominent examples include
the personal computer or digital music distribution industries, which are dominated by
Microsoft’s Windows and Apple’s iTunes, respectively. At the normative level, we shed light
on the nature of the social inefficiencies that competitive pricing in markets with two-sided
platforms generate.
We extend the Katz-Shapiro framework to model a situation in which two platform
providers mediate between developers of products based on the platform and users of such
products. This may be representative of hardware/software industries such as personal com-
puters, smart phones, or videogames. Developers and users first trade with the platform
providers by adopting one of the two platforms. Platforms are assumed to be horizontally
1In their setting, platforms set access prices to users but not to software developers. Moreover, there is
no transaction between independent software vendors and users.
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differentiated from the users’ viewpoints. After having gained access to one platform, users
buy applications from developers under oligopolistic conditions that, to a large extent, de-
pend on the pricing structures set by the platform providers.
We compare the nature of platform competition under application compatibility and
incompatibility. Under compatibility, active developers can sell their applications to all the
users, regardless of the platform they have adopted.2 As a result, developers do not benefit
from platform-specific network externalities and perceive both platforms as homogeneous
in that they give access to the same pool of users and number of competitors. Platform
homogeneity leads to intense competition for developers: platforms set developer access prices
equal to the marginal cost to serve them. Marginal cost pricing implies plentiful entry by
developers and low application prices. Under compatibility, platforms cannot vertically
differentiate based on the number of applications because users foresee having access to a
unique pool of applications. However, because platforms are assumed to be horizontally
differentiated, platform providers have some pricing power on the user side. Moreover,
because application prices are low in this case, there is large potential value that can be
extracted from users through platform access prices. Put differently, access prices to users
end up being high because (i) platforms are differentiated horizontally and (ii) inter-group
network externalities are exploited very intensely due to fierce competition for developers.
We also find that compatibility gives rise to a unique equilibrium and that this equilibrium
is symmetric.
The nature of platform competition changes dramatically when platforms are incompat-
ible. To begin, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium under incompatibility, but there
are also asymmetric equilibria. The symmetric equilibrium under incompatibility exhibits
softer price competition for developers compared to the case in which platforms are compat-
ible. Less intense competition for developers leads to reduced entry and higher application
prices. This implies that less user surplus is generated and, thus, access prices to users end
up being lower than in the case of compatible platforms.3 In fact, when horizontal differ-
entiation between platforms is mild and competition for users intense, platform providers
end up subsidizing user entry. An important feature of the symmetric equilibrium under
2More precisely, under (full) platform compatibility, an application sold by a developer is functional on
any platform, no matter with which platform provider the developer traded in the first period. Under
platform incompatibility, an application sold by a developer is valuable only on the platform sold by the
platform provider with which such developer traded.
3That platform compatibility softens price competition for users in a setting with two-sided platforms is
consistent with earlier results. Katz and Shapiro (1985), for instance, derive this result in a setting with
network externalities and one-sided platforms and Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989) in
the absence of network externalities.
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incompatibility is that it results in lower platform profits than under compatibility, even if
platform-access fees charged to developers are above marginal cost.
Incompatibility is a pervasive feature of many markets with two-sided platforms. This
raises the question of why platform providers do not make their platforms compatible if equi-
librium profits are higher in that regime. To address this question we study some asymmetric
equilibria that are present under incompatibility. In these equilibria, users and developers
form expectations favorable to one of the platforms, and hence such platform is able to cor-
ner the market by pricing the competitor out. When horizontal differentiation is weak, such
equilibria yield higher profits for the winning platform compared to profits in the unique
equilibrium under compatibility. Hence, we find that it is the quest for market dominance
that prevents providers of platforms from agreeing to make them compatible. We conclude
that incompatibility is associated with market dominance, as happens in Katz and Shapiro
(1985). Unlike their one-sided setting, however, our model suggests that tipping may be
grounded upon user subsidization. We also show that profits for the dominant platform are
decreasing in the strength of horizontal differentiation. In fact, when horizontal differentia-
tion is strong, profits in the symmetric incompatible equilibrium may be larger than those
of the dominant platform in the asymmetric case. The reason is that stronger differentiation
makes it harder for a platform to corner the market, since it has to attract users whose
appeal for such a platform is lower.
Our model also allows for detailed social welfare analysis. We find that when platforms
are incompatible, the underexploitation of the inter-group network externalities originated
on the user side results in fewer developers than socially desirable. Because the providers of
incompatible platforms cannot capture all the gains that accrue to users if more developers
enter, there is no point in promoting too much entry by developers. The result of insufficient
entry by developers is reversed under platform compatibility. The fierce price competition for
developers that takes place when platforms are compatible (marginal cost pricing) together
with the presence of fixed entry costs for developers, results in too many developers relative
to what is socially desirable.
As in Katz and Shapiro (1985), we find that a welfare-maximizing social planner prefers
compatibility over incompatibility if she can control access prices because welfare-enhancing
network externalities can be generated at a lower cost under compatibility. However, the
social welfare that arises when platforms compete against one another (in the absence of a
social planner) may be larger with incompatibility. We find that the social welfare comparison
is ambiguous when platforms play the unique symmetric equilibrium under compatibility and
incompatibility. Compatibility leads to more intense exploitation of inter-group network
3
externalities but also to excessive entry. The trade off between the benefits of network
externalities and the costs of entry is resolved differently depending on the intensity of users’
preferences for the horizontal attributes of platforms. We also find that competition under
compatibility may lead to lower welfare than market dominance by an incompatible platform.
Specifically, a monopolistic platform subject to a credible threat of entry is socially desirable
if horizontal differentiation is not too strong.
1.1 Literature
We contribute to the literature on systems compatibility and oligopolistic competition, ini-
tiated by Katz and Shapiro’s (1985) path-breaking work and continued by, amongst others,
Katz and Shapiro (1986), Economides and Flyer (1997), Cre´mer, Rey and Tirole (2000), and
Malueg and Schwartz (2006). Katz and Shapiro (1994) present a detailed literature review.
Our paper is most closely related to Katz and Shapiro (1985) but differs in several impor-
tant respects. Our setup deals with two-sided platforms that are horizontally differentiated
and that play an access pricing game, while theirs studies one-sided platforms that are un-
differentiated and that play a quantity game. Their setting is most appropriate for the study
of compatibility and incompatibility in environments with direct network externalities, while
ours intends to capture situations where indirect network externalities are at play. Because
we consider two-sided platforms, we are able to draw additional conclusions on the nature
of platform competition and its impact on welfare under the different intellectual property
regimes that we consider. These additional results are not straightforward extensions of
Katz and Shapiro’s (1985) one-sided setting. For example, we find that platform providers
compete fiercely for developers when platforms are compatible and for users when they are
incompatible. In fact, when horizontal differences across platforms are feeble, incompatible
platforms are sold below marginal cost to users. Our model predicts that user subsidization
may occur only when platforms are incompatible; compatible platforms are never sold below
cost to either side. These results, which appear consistent with anecdotal evidence that
platforms such as videogame systems are typically priced below marginal cost for users, can
only be obtained in a model that explicitly considers both sides of the market. Another
aspect that our two-sided setting allows us to study are the effects of developer entry on
social efficiency, which differ depending on whether platforms are compatible or not.
The approach that we follow in this paper is that of the recent literature on two-sided
platforms, which has mainly studied the reasons why competing platform providers may find
it optimal to sell their products cheaply to one side of the market while charging a high price
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to the other side.4 Within this literature, our paper is closest to those in which agents on
both sides first trade with the platform providers and then with each other. Caillaud and
Jullien (2001, 2003) examine matchmaking intermediation services, such as those provided
by dating or real estate agencies, in a model with ex ante identical matchmakers that bear
no fixed costs. These papers dealing with incompatible platforms assume that once a match
is made, agents realize all gains from trade, and pay special attention to equilibria in which
a platform provider prices a competitor out of the market. Such dominant firm equilibria
are supported by optimistic rational expectations of agents on both sides of the market,
according to which every agent expects everyone else to interact with the dominant firm. Our
paper also highlights the importance of agents’ expectations in the emergence of dominant
firm equilibria in a somewhat related context. In our model, however, trade between users
and developers is not efficient and several features of the downstream market structure are
endogenously determined.
Our paper is also related to Hagiu (2009), which pioneers the analysis of how platform
pricing structures are affected by consumers’ preferences for product variety in a setting with
monopolistically competitive developers. In a related paper, Hagiu (2006b) focuses on the
efficiency of open (or free access) vs. proprietary platforms, a topic which is of independent
interest to that of platform (in)compatibility. Indeed, platform compatibility is studied by
a few recent papers dealing with two-sided platforms. Orman (2008) studies the effects of
compatibility on competition between proprietary and open two-sided platforms and shows
that compatibility may increase profits for the proprietary platform. We focus on the case
where both competing platforms are proprietary. Miao (2007) studies two-sided platforms
composed of two components supplied by different producers (such as TV sets and TV
broadcasting equipment) and examines suppliers’ incentives to provide compatibility within
platforms. In contrast, our analysis deals with integrated platform suppliers and is concerned
with application compatibility between platforms.
Our paper takes up one of the extensions suggested by Carrillo and Tan (2006). Us-
ing their terminology, we analyze the equilibrium outcome of a game in which competing
platforms can choose between complete compatibility without standardization and incom-
patibility. If the equilibrium under incompatibility is characterized by both platforms being
active, we show that platforms would have a strong incentive to negotiate complete com-
4This literature has largely flourished on the basis of industry-specific models. Rochet and Tirole (2003),
for example, is inspired by the credit card market, Armstrong (2006) captures well the economics of shopping
malls or newspapers, and Hagiu (2009) maps to competition between providers of videogame systems. See
Rochet and Tirole (2006) for the formal definition of two-sided markets and a general framework that renders
much of the earlier literature as special cases.
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patibility without standardization.5 However, if incompatibility results in a single platform
dominating the market in equilibrium (an outcome that is more likely when platform hori-
zontal differentiation is low), then there is no incentive to negotiate complete compatibility
without standardization or complete standardization.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two-period platform com-
petition model. In sections 3 and 4 we study competitive interaction between compatible
and incompatible platforms, respectively, focusing on symmetric equilibria. Section 5 stud-
ies asymmetric equilibria and compares profits and welfare under both intellectual property
regimes. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 6.
2 The model
Consider a platform provider, labeled by i, that mediates between developers of products
based on its platform and users of such products. The platform provider could be a supplier
of operating systems, in which case developers would be independent software vendors and
users would be individuals or firms that make use of such applications. The platform provider
sets access prices for both, users and developers. In the case of operating systems providers,
the price charged to users is that of the operating system, while that for developers is the
price of the software development kit or a license fee.6 We denote the access price paid by
users by pUi and that paid by developers by p
D
i . After users and developers have transacted
with the platform provider, developers compete against one another to sell their applications.
A forward-looking platform provider sets pUi and p
D
i to maximize profits taking into account
the resulting structure of the market for applications.
To analyze this situation formally when two platform providers exist, we set up the
following two-period game which extends Church and Gandal’s (1993) approach to a market
with two-sided platforms. The first period consists of two stages. In the first stage, platform
provider i ∈ {1, 2} posts access prices (pUi , pDi ). In the second stage, all potential users and
developers simultaneously decide whether or not to trade with one of the platform providers.
In the second period, developers who traded with platform provider i sell applications to
users who own platform i (in the case of platform incompatibility) or any of the two platforms
(in the case of compatibility).
As usual in multi-period contexts, we focus on (pure strategy) subgame-perfect equilibria
5The incentive to achieve complete standardization (i.e., having compatible platforms which are less
differentiated) would be lower because of platform homogenization.
6Introducing royalties per unit of application sold by developers makes the analysis intractable. Notwith-
standing, we discuss the likely role of royalties in the conclusion.
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assuming that all agents have rational expectations. We thus solve the model by backwards
induction. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the game for the incompatible case. The timing
for the compatible case is similar.
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Figure 1: Timing
We make the following assumptions about each player group:
Platform providers. There are two competing platforms that have no stand-alone
value (e.g., an operating system is valuable only if there are applications that can run on
it). The (constant) marginal cost cU of producing copies of a platform is normalized to zero,
so pUi is to be interpreted as a mark-up. We allow for the possibility that there may be a
positive cost of serving developers (these costs are related to the provision of development
kits and/or the structuring of licensing contracts). We assume that these costs are identical
across platform providers, and we denote them by cD ≥ 0.
Users. Users are assumed to have unit demands for platforms and linear demands
for applications, which are assumed to be homogeneous goods to simplify the analysis by
sidestepping issues related to product variety.7 Specifically, we assume that a unit mass
of (potential) users is uniformly distributed along a Hotelling segment of unit length. We
7The main arguments are not dependent on the assumption of homogeneity. We discuss the implications
of product variety for pricing structures in the concluding section.
7
suppose that the platform provider indexed by 1 is located at the left end of the segment,
whereas that indexed by 2 is located at the right end. Platform providers differ in their
location on the segment but are otherwise identical. Inspired by Novshek (1980), we assume
that user j located at distance sji ∈ [0, 1] from platform i has the following demand for ap-
plications sold at price ρi if she has acquired platform i: qj(ρi, sji) = (1−tsji)(a−bρi) (where
both a and b are positive constants).8 In combination with the heterogeneous locations of
users on [0, 1], parameter t ≥ 0 captures the intensity of horizontal differences regarding the
perceived performance of the platform by the time it is used with the applications sold by
developers: every user has a different demand function for applications (unless t = 0), and
hence users are heterogeneous even after acquiring a platform.9 We let xi denote the measure
of users who trade with platform provider i and assume that t < 2/3 to guarantee that the
market is covered.10 Therefore, we shall focus on those situations in which x1 = 1− x2.
It is worth noting that departing from the widely used model of unit demand for ap-
plications allows us to perform social welfare analysis even if all users purchase one of the
platforms and the market is completely covered. In addition, in markets such as video
games, personal computers, or smart phones, users often purchase one platform only but
buy many applications. Therefore, this aspect of our model is closer to the phenomenon
than a specification where users have unitary demands for both, platforms and applications.
Developers. We suppose that there exist infinitely many potential developers of appli-
cations, all ex ante identical, and free entry. Those who have traded with one of the platform
providers in the first period must also incur a sunk setup cost f ≥ 0 to become active in the
second period. Developers active in the second period produce applications at non-negative
constant marginal cost c, assumed to be smaller than a/b to avoid making the analysis trivial,
and compete a` la Cournot. Cournot competition can be interpreted as a reduced-form for
simultaneous capacity choice by developers followed by simultaneous capacity-constrained
8A relevant property of this specification is that the sensitivity of user j’s demand to changes in the price
of applications does not depend on differences in the perceived performance of the two competing platforms
(i.e., it does not depend on sji). This property is useful in that it simplifies how first-period behavior affects
competitive behavior in the second period (e.g., the equilibrium prices of applications do not depend on the
number of users attracted by a platform). More complete models must await further research on these issues
which seem far from being easily tractable.
9In our setting, horizontal differences across platforms persist even if they are compatible. For instance,
a videogame console may load games faster and provide higher definition video and sound compared to
another one but may consume more power in doing so. If users differ in the relative weight that they assign
to loading speed, video and sound definition, and power consumption, then the platforms will be horizontally
differentiated even if they can both run the same applications. We discuss in Subsection 5.2.3 how our results
would be affected when horizontal differentiation is weaker under compatibility.
10This is standard in Hotelling models of horizontal differentiation. The analysis when the market is not
covered can be found in the working paper version (available at SSRN as a NET Institute working paper).
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price competition amongst them, as shown by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). We use ni to
denote the number of developers that trade with platform provider i. As customary in the
oligopolistic entry literature (Suzumura and Kiyono 1987), we will usually ignore the integer
problem and treat the number of developers as a continuous variable.
Cournot competition captures the fact that developers best-respond to one another when
making profit-maximizing choices. Given the concentration levels in developer communities
such as those in video games or personal computers,11 it is likely that players do take into
account each others’ actions when choosing their strategies. Our model reflects this. In
addition, the original work by Katz and Shapiro (1985) on which we build assumes that
platforms play an output game with homogeneous products. We make a first step towards
greater realism by adding horizontally differentiated platforms that deal with two sides. In
the conclusion (Section 6) we discuss the effect of adding heterogeneous applications to our
framework.12
In what follows, we distinguish two situations, depending on whether platforms are com-
patible or not. Platforms are compatible if any given application can be used in either
platform. Platforms are incompatible if any given application can only be used in the plat-
form for which it was originally developed.
3 Compatible platforms
As mentioned above, the game is solved by backwards induction. We begin by solving
for the second period outcomes, given {(pUi , pDi ;xi, ni)}2i=1. Under compatibility any one
of the ni developers who have traded with platform provider i ∈ {1, 2} sells applications
that can be used by users of the competing platform. User demand for the homogeneous
good sold by developers depends on the location of the user and the platform that she uses.
Letting x1 denote the location of the marginal user who purchased platform provider 1’s
platform, it is immediate that those users to the left of x1 must have traded with 1 as well
by monotonicity. Similarly, letting x2 denote the distance between platform provider 2 and
the marginal user who purchased provider 2’s platform, the users in between must also have
traded with 2. In addition, note that developers produce homogeneous goods regardless of
the platform provider they traded with in the first period, so they must charge the same
market price ρ as dictated by the properties of standard Cournot competition. Because
11For instance, the top seven game developers (in terms of market share) accounted for almost two thirds
of industry sales in the US in 2004.
12Models with both, heterogeneous applications and strategic behavior by developers, have proven in-
tractable.
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the demand for applications of user j located at distance sji ∈ [0, xi] from platform i, is
given by qj(ρ, sji) = (1 − tsji)(a − bρ), it follows that aggregate demand for applications
equals Q(ρ) =
∫ x1
0
qj(ρ, sj1)dj +
∫ x2
0
qj(ρ, sj2)dj, and hence aggregate demand for compatible
applications given a market price ρ is equal to
Q(ρ) = [(x1 − tx
2
1
2
) + (x2 − tx
2
2
2
)](a− bρ),
and inverse demand is as follows:
ρ(Q) =
a
b
− 2Q
b[(2x1 − tx21) + (2x2 − tx22)]
.
Therefore, second-period Cournot competition with n1 + n2 ≡ N developers yields the fol-
lowing equilibrium price for an application:
ρcom =
a+ bcN
b(N + 1)
.
Every developer sells qcom applications, where
qcom =
[(2x1 − tx21) + (2x2 − tx22)](a− bc)
2(N + 1)
,
and makes profits equal to
picom =
[(2x1 − tx21) + (2x2 − tx22)]
2b
(
a− bc
N + 1
)2
. (1)
For fixed {(pUi , pDi )}2i=1, the effect of compatibility on developers is two-fold. On the one
hand, developers have access to a larger pool of users than if platforms were not compatible.
On the other, they face more intense competition.
If user j has traded with platform i and is located at distance sij from such platform,
then she attains the following second-period utility:
ucomj (sji) =
∫ a/b
ρcom
(1− tsji)(a− bρ)dρ = (1− tsji)(a− bρ
com)2
2b
=
(1− tsji)
2b
(
(a− bc)N
N + 1
)2
.
(2)
For fixed access prices, compatibility enables users to access a larger pool of developers than
if platforms were not compatible. This concludes the analysis of the second period subgame.
We now solve the first period. There are two stages. Stage one is the price setting stage.
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Stage two is the adoption subgame where users and developers choose simultaneously which
platform to join. We are interested in analyzing symmetric equilibria in which platforms set
the same access prices (pU1 = p
U
2 = p
U∗ and pD1 = p
D
2 = p
D∗).
Consider the second stage. Given {(pUi , pDi )}2i=1, users and developers choose which plat-
form to join. We first study the choice by users. Because we focus on full market coverage,
we have that x1 = 1 − x2. We thus drop subscripts. In this case, the user ĵ indifferent be-
tween trading with platform providers 1 and 2 is at distance x from 1. Because the market
is fully covered, x also denotes the measure of users served by platform provider 1 and 1− x
that of users served by platform provider 2.
For fixed prices pU1 and p
U
2 , the location of the indifferent user is given by:
ucombj (x)− pU1 = ucombj (1− x)− pU2
or
(1− tx)
2b
(
(a− bc)N
N + 1
)2
− pU1 =
(1− t(1− x))
2b
(
(a− bc)N
N + 1
)2
− pU2 . (3)
Hence, user demand for provider 1’s platform is
x(pU1 , p
U
2 ) =
1
2
+
b(pU2 − pU1 )
t(a− bc)2
(
N + 1
N
)2
. (4)
Consider now the developers. The net profit made by a developer who trades with
platform provider i ∈ {1, 2} is
picom − f − pDi =
(2− t+ 2tx− 2tx2)
2b
(
a− bc
N + 1
)2
− f − pDi ,
where we have suppressed the arguments of x(·) to ease notation. Developers’ profits in the
second period do not depend on the platform they develop for. Thus, both platforms are
perceived as homogeneous by developers and they will choose platform based solely on the
entry fees being charged (pD1 and p
D
2 ). Bertrand competition for developers implies that the
lowest entry fee will fully determine the number of active developers.13 That is, the following
must be satisfied for any volume of users captured by platform provider i:
(2− t+ 2tx− 2tx2)
2b
(
a− bc
N + 1
)2
− f −min{pD1 , pD2 } = 0. (5)
13Although free entry implies that developers end up earning zero profits regardless of the platform they
join, it is assumed that the platform charging the lowest pD attracts all developers, that is, in case of
indifference, developers prefer the platform whose access fee is lowest.
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Thus, given {(pUi , pDi )}2i=1, the equilibrium of the second-stage subgame (x∗, N∗) is the
solution to the system of two equations formed by (4) and (5). It is easy to see that when
access prices are symmetric, pU1 = p
U
2 and p
D
1 = p
D
2 , the system has one solution only and that
in that solution x∗ = 1
2
(symmetry in the first stage implies symmetry in the second stage).
To guarantee that N∗ ≥ 1, the following must happen (a− bc)
2
2b
≥ 8(f + min
{
pD1 , p
D
2
}
)
4− t .
We will assume that this is satisfied in equilibrium (see below). When access prices are not
symmetric, the system can be shown to have at most two solutions. When there are two
solutions, however, only one solution has 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and N ≥ 1.14 Therefore, in searching for
equilibria to the first-stage price choices, we need only consider the behavior of one solution
to (4) and (5).
We now study the first stage where both platform providers simultaneously choose
{(pUi , pDi )}2i=1. We begin by showing that there can be no symmetric equilibrium in which
both platform providers charge an entry fee for developers above cD. Otherwise, one of
the platform providers could slightly decrease the price charged to developers, which would
discontinuously increase the number of developers she serves, thereby increasing profits.15
Similarly, there can be no symmetric equilibrium in which both platform providers subsidize
developers (pD1 = p
D
2 ≡ pD∗ < cD). Otherwise, one of the providers could unilaterally raise
her entry fee, which would not affect profits made on the user side, and would stop losses on
the developer side. Therefore, if a symmetric equilibrium exists, then it must be such that
pD1 = p
D
2 ≡ pD∗ = cD.
Next, we derive a unique candidate to symmetric equilibrium for pU1 and p
U
2 . Platform 1’s
profit is Π1(p
U
1 , p
U
2 ) = p
U
1 x(p
U
1 , p
U
2 ) and platform 2’s profit is Π2(p
U
1 , p
U
2 ) = p
U
2 (1− x(pU1 , pU2 )),
so the first-order conditions are:
x(pU1 , p
U
2 ) + p
U
1
∂x(pU1 )
∂pU1
= 0,
1− x(pU1 , pU2 )− pU2
∂x(pU1 )
∂pU2
= 0.
To derive an expression for the partial derivatives, let N(x) be the unique N that solves (5)
14Moreover, the solution in the correct range is obtained continuously from (x∗, N∗). Fix pU1 = p
U
2 ≡ pU
and pD1 = p
D
2 ≡ pD. Suppose that the parameter values are such that the only solution to the system of
equations has x∗ = 12 and N
∗ ≥ 1 (which is required for equilibrium). Fix a small  > 0. For new access
prices {(pUi , pDi )}2i=1 satisfying pU −  < pUi < pU + , pU1 6= pU2 and pD −  < pDi < pD + , the system has
two solutions (x∗1, N
∗
1 ) and (x
∗
2, N
∗
2 ). The first solution is “close” to (x
∗, N∗) and satisfies 0 ≤ x∗1 ≤ 1 and
N∗1 ≥ 1. The second solution is discontinuous (“far away” from (x∗, N∗)) and in the wrong range: x∗2 > 1
and/or N∗2 < 1.
15Note as well that this would have an arbitrarily small effect on user demand for such provider’s platform,
which does not affect the thrust of the argument.
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given x:
N(x) =
√
(2− t+ 2tx− 2tx2)(a− bc)2
2b(f + pDi )
− 1.
Then, using the result that pD1 = p
D
2 ≡ pD∗ = cD, the marginal user condition (eq. 4) can
be expressed as:
x(pU1 , p
U
2 )−
1
2
− b(p
U
2 − pU1 )
t(a− bc)2(1−
√
2b(f + cD)
[2− t+ 2tx(pU1 , pU2 )− 2t(x(pU1 , pU2 ))2](a− bc)2
)2
= 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem yields:
∂x(pU1 , p
U
2 )
∂pU1
= − 1
t(a− bc)2( N(x)
N(x) + 1
)2
b
+
2t(1− 2x)(pU2 − pU1 )
√
2b(f + cD)
(a− bc)2
(2− t+ 2tx− 2tx2) 32 ( N(x)
N(x) + 1
)
.
Using this expression in the above first-order conditions, we see that the following must hold
in a symmetric equilibrium:
pU1 = p
U
2 ≡ pU∗ =
t(a− bc)2
2b
(1−
√
4b(f + cD)
(4− t)(a− bc)2 )
2.
To guarantee that N∗ = N(1
2
) ≥ 1, we assume that (a− bc)
2
2b
≥ 8(f + c
D)
4− t . This concludes
our search for a candidate to symmetric equilibrium (pU∗, pD∗).
To prove that both platform providers setting (pU∗, pD∗) constitutes an equilibrium, it
only remains to rule out deviations involving decreases in the entry fee accompanied by
changes in the price charged to users.16 In order to show that one of the platform providers,
1 say, has no incentive to do so, note that if 1’s entry fee is the lowest, then it will attract
n1 developers, where n1 is given by the following free-entry condition:
pD1 =
(2− t+ 2tx− 2tx2)
2b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
− f . (6)
16It is clear that upward changes in the entry fee do not increase profit to be made on developers and do
not affect N∗, which means that no platform provider has an incentive to change its user price given that
its competitor’s user price is kept fixed.
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Because there is a one-to-one relationship between pD1 and n1 (given x), we can let platform
provider 1 choose pU1 and n1 (instead of p
D
1 ) while keeping p
U
2 and p
D
2 fixed.
We note the following useful fact: given pD1 , n1 is maximal when x =
1
2
. Therefore,
platform 1 will be able to attract n1 developers at lowest cost when x =
1
2
.17 When x 6= 1
2
,
to attract n1 developers platform 1 will need to set a lower p
D
1 , thus earning less from this
side of the market. When x = 1
2
, the free-entry condition (6) becomes:
pD1 =
(4− t)
4b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
− f . (7)
We show that even if the number of developers was determined by eq. (7) (this is the best
case for platform 1), it will not desire to deviate. Using (4) and (7), we have that platform
provider 1 solves
max
pU1 ,n1
Π1(p
U
1 , n1) = max
pU1 ,n1
[
pU1 (
1
2
+
b(pU∗ − pU1 )
t(a− bc)2
(
n1 + 1
n1
)2
) +
(4− t) (a− bc)2 n1
4b(n1 + 1)2
− (f + cD)n1
]
.
It is simple to show that the derivative with respect to pU1 evaluated at (p
U∗, N∗) is zero. In
turn, the (right) derivative with respect to n1 evaluated at (p
U∗, N∗) is non-positive (since
N∗ ≥ 1). The question is then whether the decrease in profit from larger n1 is compensated
by the profit increase from an increase in pU1 . To see that the answer is negative, we solve
∂Π1(p
U
1 , n1)
∂pU1
= 0 for pU1 to obtain
pU1 (n1) =
1
4
(
2pU∗ +
(a− bc)2 n21t
b(n1 + 1)2
)
.
We then substitute pU1 (n1) in Π1(p
U
1 , n1) to obtain profit as a function of n1 alone, Π1(n1).
Finally, a little algebra shows that
∂Π1(n1)
∂n1
< 0 for all parameter values. Hence, both
platform providers setting prices (pU∗, pD∗) constitutes the unique symmetric equilibrium of
the game.
The properties of such an equilibrium outcome are driven by the full evaporation of
profits on the developer side because developers perceive platforms to be homogeneous. The
fact that platforms are not characterized by idiosyncratic network externalities implies that
providers compete for users as in a traditional Hotelling framework. Hence, profits just accrue
17We say “cost” because the only potentially helpful deviations from pD1 = p
D
2 = p
D∗ = cD involve
pD1 < c
D, a negative markup.
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because users perceive platforms to be horizontally differentiated. In particular, equilibrium
profits are equal to
Π∗ =
t(a− bc)2
4b
(
N∗
N∗ + 1
)2
≥ 0.
Note also that the marginal user achieves positive utility in equilibrium, that is,
(2− 3t)(a− bc)2
4b
(
N∗
N∗ + 1
)2
> 0
holds because t ∈ [0, 2/3).
We summarize the properties of the unique symmetric equilibrium that we have just
derived as follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose that there exist two platform providers that sell compatible plat-
forms. The unique symmetric equilibrium yields profits for each firm equal to
Π∗ =
t(a− bc)2
4b
(
N∗
N∗ + 1
)2
.
Moreover, users are not subsidized to purchase the platform, whereas developers are charged
an entry fee equal to marginal cost: pU∗ ≥ 0 = cU and pD∗ = cD.
3.1 Social efficiency
We now derive the welfare-maximizing number of developers under the assumption that the
social planner can control the number of developers who become active in the first period,
but not their subsequent behavior. We show that price competition for developers is too
harsh and results in excessive entry.
In this second-best scenario, a welfare-maximizing social planner who targeted full market
coverage would face the following problem:
max
N
W com(N) = max
N
[2
∫ 1
2
0
(1− tj)(a− bc)2
2b
(
N
N + 1
)2
dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Users’ surplus
+ (
(4− t)(a− bc)2
4b
(
1
N + 1
)2
− f − cD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Platforms’ profits
N ]
(8)
= max
N
[
(4− t)(a− bc)2
8b
(1− 1
(N + 1)2
)− (f + cD)N ].
It is straightforward to show that the efficient number of developers is given by the solution
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to the first-order condition:
N e =
(
(4− t)(a− bc)2
4b(f + cD)
) 1
3
− 1. (9)
Hence, the fact that N∗ =
(
(4− t)(a− bc)2
4b(f + cD)
) 1
2
− 1 and the assumption that (a− bc)
2
2b
≥
8(f + cD)
4− t (made earlier to ensure that N
∗ ≥ 1) yield that N e < N∗. Using equation (9),
it is straightforward that the entry fee pDe that implements the socially efficient outcome
exceeds marginal cost cD. The result that we have just proved is stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose there exist two competing platform providers that sell compatible
platforms. Then entry by developers is excessive from a social planner’s viewpoint: N∗ > N e.
Moreover, the socially efficient entry fee does not subsidize developers: pDe > cD.
Bertrand competition for developers implies that the social marginal cost of promoting
developer entry coincides with the entry costs faced by an extra developer. Therefore,
both the additional developer and a social planner would consider the exact same costs
of entry, f + cD. However, the additional developer and the social planner differ in their
assessment of the benefits of entry. The second-period profits that an extra developer earns
if it enters are always greater than the additional second-period social surplus generated by
this extra developer. Hence, entry is excessive from a social welfare standpoint, since the
social incentives to promote developer entry are weaker than the private incentives to enter.
4 Incompatible platforms
When platforms are incompatible, the ni application developers who have traded with plat-
form provider i develop applications that work exclusively with that platform.
We begin by solving for the second period outcomes, given {(pUi , pDi ;xi, ni)}2i=1. Amongst
users who bought platform i ∈ {1, 2}, let xi denote the distance from i for the individual
located farthest away. Monotonicity implies that those individuals whose distance from i
is less than xi must have traded with i as well, so the measure of users served by platform
provider i is xi. If the ni developers who have traded with platform i charge price ρi, then
the demand for applications by user j located at distance sji ∈ [0, xi] from platform i is
given by qj(ρi, sji) = (1 − tsji)(a − bρi). It follows that aggregate demand for applications
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functional on i equals Qi(ρi, xi) =
∫ xi
0
qj(ρi, sji)dj = xi(1−
txi
2
)(a− bρi), and hence inverse
demand is
ρi(Qi, xi) =
a
b
− 2Qi
bxi(2− txi) .
Having obtained aggregate demand, it is standard to show that ρinci =
a+ nibc
b(ni + 1)
is the
second-period equilibrium price of platform i’s applications under Cournot competition, and
hence each earns the following post-entry profits:
piinci =
xi(2− txi)
2b
(
a− bc
ni + 1
)2
. (10)
User j who is located at distance sji from platform i ∈ [0, xi] and who has acquired such
platform, attains the following second-period surplus:
uincj (sji) =
∫ a/b
ρinci
(1− tsji)(a− bρi)dρi =
(1− tsji)(a− bρinci )2
2b
=
(1− tsji)n2i
2b
(
a− bc
ni + 1
)2
.
(11)
Observe that, ceteris paribus, users would benefit from competition between developers,
whereas a larger market size in the second period would make developers better off. Hence,
both sides exhibit positive inter-group network externalities that must be acknowledged by
platforms when setting access prices in the first period. In addition, the developer side
exhibits negative intra-group network externalities, since, for a fixed measure of users, in-
creasing the number of developers would destroy second-period profits. This concludes the
analysis of the second period subgame.
We now solve the first-period. We are interested in analyzing symmetric equilibria in
which platforms set the same access prices (pU1 = p
U
2 = p
U∗∗ and pD1 = p
D
2 = p
D∗∗). Consider
first the second stage. Given {(pUi , pDi )}2i=1, users and developers choose which platform to
join. We first study the choice by users. Because x1 = 1 − x2 (i.e., the market is fully
covered), we drop subscripts so that x denotes the measure of users served by platform
provider 1 and 1 − x denotes the measure of users served by platform provider 2. The
location of the marginal user ĵ given that her distance from platform 1 is x must be given
by uincbj (x)− pU1 = uincbj (1− x)− pU2 , or
(1− tx)n21
2b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
− pU1 =
(1− t(1− x))n22
2b
(
a− bc
n2 + 1
)2
− pU2 . (12)
Regarding the other side of the market, the following free-entry condition must hold for
17
those developers trading with platform provider i ∈ {1, 2}:
pDi =
xi(2− txi)
2b
(
a− bc
ni + 1
)2
− f , (13)
where xi = x if i = 1 and xi = 1− x otherwise.
Given {(pUi , pDi )}2i=1, the outcome to the second-stage subgame (x, n1, and n2) is the
solution to the system of three equations and three unknowns formed by (12) and (13,
i = 1, 2). Numerical analysis shows that there may be more than one solution to that
system.18 Different solutions correspond to different ways in which users and developers
coordinate their adoption decisions of which platform to join. For example, when access
prices are symmetric pU1 = p
U
2 and p
D
1 = p
D
2 , depending on the parameter values, there
is either a unique solution (x∗∗, N∗∗) (this solution satisfies x∗∗ = 1
2
) or there are three
solutions (x∗∗1 , N
∗∗
1 ), (x
∗∗
2 , N
∗∗
2 ), and (x
∗∗
3 , N
∗∗
3 ). One of the three solutions, say (x
∗∗
2 , N
∗∗
2 ),
has x∗∗2 =
1
2
. Another solution, say (x∗∗1 , N
∗∗
1 ), has x
∗∗
1 <
1
2
. The other solution has x∗∗3 >
1
2
.
We deal with the issue of multiple solutions to the system by requiring symmetric equilib-
ria to meet a monotonicity criterion. Following Caillaud and Jullien (2003), we will require
that unilateral deviations by one platform that involve (weakly) increasing the access prices
should not lead to increases in user and developer demand for the platform.19 Only the
solution with x∗∗2 =
1
2
satisfies this criterion. Thus, in searching for equilibria when access
prices are symmetric, we will consider the solution with x∗∗2 =
1
2
only. When access prices
are asymmetric, the system has three solutions or no solutions at all. When there are three
solutions, only one solution satisfies Caillaud and Jullien’s (2003) monotonicity criterion.20
We now derive the equilibrium access prices. Because the free-entry condition (13) implies
that (
(a− bc)ni
ni + 1
)2
=
(
a− bc−
√
2b(pDi + f)
xi(2− txi)
)2
,
18The Mathematica code is available from the authors.
19The monotonicity criterion is (trivially) satisfied in the unique symmetric equilibrium under compatibility
derived in Section 3.
20Moreover, the only solution that satisfies Caillaud and Jullien’s criterion is obtained continuously from
(x∗∗2 , N
∗∗
2 ). Fix p
U
1 = p
U
2 ≡ pU and pD1 = pD2 ≡ pD. Consider the solution (x∗∗2 , N∗∗2 ) with x∗∗2 = 12 . Fix a
small  > 0. For new access prices {(pUi , pDi )}2i=1 satisfying pU− < pUi < pU+ and pD− < pDi < pD+, the
system has three solutions (xˆ∗∗1 , Nˆ
∗∗
1 ), (xˆ
∗∗
2 , Nˆ
∗∗
2 ), and (xˆ
∗∗
3 , Nˆ
∗∗
3 ). The first solution is “close” to (x
∗∗
1 , N
∗∗
1 ),
the second to (x∗∗2 , N
∗∗
2 ), and the third to (x
∗∗
3 , N
∗∗
3 ). Only (xˆ
∗∗
2 , Nˆ
∗∗
2 ) satisfies the monotonicity criterion.
18
expression (12) can be rewritten as:
(1− tx)
(
a− bc−
√
2b(pD1 +f)
x(2−tx)
)2
2b
+
(t− 1− tx)
(
a− bc−
√
2b(pD2 +f)
(1−x)(2−t(1−x))
)2
2b
+ pU2 − pU1 = 0.
(14)
This equation implicitly defines an expression for x as a function of pU1 and p
D
1 (that is, we
have that x(pU1 , p
D
1 ), although we will sometimes suppress the dependence to save space).
Using (13) and (14), platform provider 1’s problem can be written as follows:
max
pU1 ,p
D
1
Π1(p
U
1 , p
D
1 ) = max
pU1 ,p
D
1
[pU1 x(p
U
1 , p
D
1 ) + (p
D
1 − cD)n1(pU1 , pD1 )]
= max
pU1 ,p
D
1
[pU1 x(p
U
1 , p
D
1 ) + (p
D
1 − cD)(
(a− bc)
√
x(pU1 , p
D
1 )(2− tx(pU1 , pD1 ))√
2b(pD1 + f)
− 1)].
Developer surplus is fully extracted via pD1 (since all developers are symmetric) and user
surplus is extracted via pU1 , although all users enjoy a strictly positive utility because of full
market coverage. Note that user surplus can be captured either directly or via the developers.
The first-order conditions are:
x(pU1 , p
D
1 ) + (p
U
1 +
(pD1 − cD)(a− bc)(1− tx(pU1 , pD1 ))√
2b(pD1 + f)x(p
U
1 , p
D
1 )(2− tx(pU1 , pD1 ))
)
∂x(pU1 , p
D
1 )
∂pU1
= 0 (15)
and
pU1
∂x(pU1 , p
D
1 )
∂pD1
+
(a− bc)
√
x(pU1 , p
D
1 )(2− tx(pU1 , pD1 ))√
2b(pD1 + f)
− 1 + (pD1 − cD)×
(16)
(
(a− bc)(1− tx(pU1 , pD1 ))√
2b(pD1 + f)x(p
U
1 , p
D
1 )(2− tx(pU1 , pD1 ))
∂x(pU1 , p
D
1 )
∂pD1
− (a− bc)
√
x(pU1 , p
D
1 )(2− tx(pU1 , pD1 ))
2
√
2b(pD1 + f)
3
) = 0
Note from expression (15) that there is an additional term relative to traditional settings
without network externalities owing to the inter-group network externality exerted by users
on developers. The second term within the parenthesis reflects the fact that changing the user
price affects the number of users who choose to acquire the platform, which in turn affects
the developers’ demand for the platform and hence the gain/loss made on the developer side.
A similar observation can be made regarding (16), taking into account that changing the
entry fee affects the number of developers not only by varying the (sunk) cost of entry but
also by changing the size of the second-period market.
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Given the algebraic complexity of solving for the symmetric equilibrium under incompat-
ibility, we relegate that derivation to the Appendix (see proof of Proposition 3). Similarly
to the case of compatible platforms, we use the implicit function theorem to derive expres-
sions for ∂x(pU1 , p
D
1 )/∂p
U
1 and ∂x(p
U
1 , p
D
1 )/∂p
D
1 . We use those expressions in conjunction to
equations (15) and (16) and the assumption of symmetry to solve for the equilibrim access
prices pU∗∗ and pD∗∗.
To simplify notation, let
Z ≡ 4(f + c
D)(t2 − 6t+ 12)3
(4− t)2t3(4 + 2t− t2) and Z
′ ≡ 4(f + c
D)(32 + 8t2 − 24t− t3)3
t3(8− t2)(4− t)5 ,
and note that Z ′ < Z for 0 < t < 2/3 (see Fig. 2). The following proposition establishes that
(a− bc)2
2b
≥ Z ′ is a necessary and sufficient condition for a symmetric equilibrium satisfying
Caillaud and Jullien’s (2003) monotonicity criterion to exist under incompatibility. We also
show that the unique symmetric equilibrium exhibits the property that developers are never
subsidized, whereas users may or may not be subsidized depending on the extent of platform
differentiation.
Proposition 3 Suppose there exist two competing platform providers that sell incompatible
platforms. A symmetric equilibrium satisfying the monotonicity criterion exists if and only
if
(a− bc)2
2b
≥ Z ′. In the unique symmetric equilibrium developers are never subsidized, and
users are subsidized if and only if
(a− bc)2
2b
< Z. In particular, it holds that pU∗∗ < 0 = cU
and pD∗∗ > cD for
(a− bc)2
2b
< Z, whereas pU∗∗ ≥ 0 = cU and pD∗∗ > cD for (a− bc)
2
2b
≥ Z.
Proof. See Appendix.
Because our model has infinitely many potential developers, incompatible platforms do
not compete to attract them via access prices but rather via the size of the user network.
When horizontal differentiation is weak, platform providers compete fiercely for users by
subsidizing their access to the platform with the aim of boosting developer entry and thus
profits made on the developer side (as stems from (15) taking into account that pD > cD
and ∂x(pU1 , p
D
1 )/∂p
U
1 < 0 at the symmetric equilibrium prices).
Incompatibility allows platforms to vertically differentiate through the number of appli-
cations that they offer. However, since in this section we are studying symmetric equilibria,
the number of developers is the same for both platforms. This implies that, in equilibrium,
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the products end up being horizontally differentiated only. In Section 5 we consider asym-
metric equilibria and show that endogenous vertical differences arise on the grounds of the
quantity of applications offered on each platform.
We have studied symmetric equilibria under the assumption that whenever pU1 = p
U
2 and
pD1 = p
D
2 the equilibrium to the second-stage subgame has x =
1
2
and n1 = n2. However,
as mentioned above, there may be other solutions to the system (12) and (13, i = 1, 2) at
the equilibrium access prices. Remark 1 says that whenever the parameter values are such
that the solution x = 1
2
satisfies Caillaud and Jullien’s (2003) monotonicity criterion, there
are three equilibria of the second-stage subgame: (i) the symmetric solution (x = 1
2
and
n1 = n2), (ii) an asymmetric solution with market dominance by platform 2 (x
′ < 1
2
and
n′1 < n
′
2); and (iii) an asymmetric solution with market dominance by platform 1 (x
′′ = 1−x′
and n′′1 = n
′
2 > n
′′
2 = n
′
1). (See Figure 2 below.)
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Figure 2: Solutions to second-stage subgame.
Remark 1 Suppose there exist two competing platform providers that sell incompatible plat-
forms at the equilibrium prices derived in Proposition 3. Then, the platform adoption sub-
game (the second stage of the first period, see Figure 1) has three equilibria: (x = 1
2
, n1 = n2);
(x′ < 1
2
, n′1 < n
′
2); and (x
′′ = 1− x′, n′′1 = n′2 > n′′2 = n′1) if and only if
(a− bc)2
2b
≥ Z ′. Oth-
erwise, there is one equilibrium only: (x = 1
2
, n1 = n2).
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Proof. See Appendix.
We end by pointing out that numerical simulations show that the two solutions with
x 6= 1
2
do not satisfy the monotonicity refinement and thus we ignore them.21 Figure 2
illustrates the result.
4.1 Social efficiency
A social planner which targeted all users and chose to let both platform providers operate
would solve:22
max
n
W inc(n) = max
n
2 [
∫ 1
2
0
(1− tj)n2
2b
(
a− bc
n+ 1
)2
dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Users’ surplus
+ (
4− t
8b
(
a− bc
n+ 1
)2
− f − cD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Platforms’ profits
n]
= max
n
[
(4− t)(a− bc)2
8b
(1− 1
(n+ 1)2
)− 2(f + cD)n].
Therefore,
ne =
(
(4− t)(a− bc)2
8b(f + cD)
) 1
3
− 1 and pDe =
(
(4− t)(a− bc)2(f + cD)2
8b
) 1
3
− f .
The following proposition shows that (symmetric) competition between incompatible
platforms leads to insufficient entry from a social efficiency point of view. Providers of
incompatible platforms do not internalize all the positive effects of the network externality
exerted on users by developers because they cannot appropriate all the gains from trade that
accrue to users. As a result, platform providers promote less than socially desirable entry
by developers, which results in social welfare losses because of insufficient consumption of
applications.
Proposition 4 Suppose there exist two competing platform providers that sell incompatible
platforms. Then the symmetric outcome of duopolistic competition is such that entry by
developers is insufficient from a social planner’s viewpoint: n∗∗ < ne. Moreover, the socially
efficient entry fee does not subsidize developers: pDe > cD.
Proof. See Appendix.
21The Mathematica code is available from the authors.
22We should point out that a social planner may prefer having just one platform provider serving both
sides of the market so as to avoid underexploitation of network externalities and duplication of costs.
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4.1.1 Welfare comparison: compatible vs. incompatible platforms
We end this section by comparing social welfare. When a social planner can control the
number of developers who become active in the first period but not their subsequent behavior
in the second period, welfare under compatibility and incompatibility are, respectively:
max
N
W com (N) = max
N
[
(4− t)(a− bc)2
8b
(1− 1
(N + 1)2
)− (f + cD)N ]
and
max
n
W inc (n) = max
n
[
(4− t)(a− bc)2
8b
(1− 1
(n+ 1)2
)− 2(f + cD)n].
Direct inspection and a revealed preference argument imply that compatibility leads to
higher total welfare. The reason is that in order for both intellectual property regimes to
produce a given level of user and developer surplus (exclusive of entry costs), incompatibility
requires duplication of costs (f + cD vs. 2(f + cD)) and thus compatibility is preferred. This
is due to the underexploitation of network externalities that occurs when platforms are
incompatible (as applications are platform-specific in this case).
5 Platform compatibility versus incompatibility
Many industries with two-sided platforms are characterized by platform incompatibility and
strong market dominance by one single firm. The purpose of this section is to investigate why
this may be so partly in light of our previous results. A natural starting point is to compare
the properties of symmetric equilibria depending on whether platforms are compatible or
not. More specifically, we examine which industry structure leads to highest equilibrium
profits. To get a sense, we consider the case in which the only fixed cost incurred by a
developer is the entry fee paid to access a platform (i.e., f = cD = 0). In this scenario, it
is easy to prove that pD∗∗ =
t2(4− t)(a− bc)2
128b
. Using this result, it is a matter of simple
algebra to show that
pU∗ =
t(a− bc)2
2b
> pU∗∗ =
t(4 + 2t− t2)(a− bc)2
32b
> 0
and
Π∗ =
t(a− bc)2
4b
> Π∗∗ =
t(24− t2 − 4t)(a− bc)2
128b
> 0.
This suggests that the (symmetric equilibrium) prices charged to users and profits are
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greater under platform compatibility than under incompatibility.23 This raises the question
of why platform providers do not somehow negotiate to make their platforms compatible,
which is also the socially efficient outcome because it avoids cost duplication (see Subsection
4.1.1). One plausible answer is that there might exist other equilibria when platforms are
incompatible in which (at least) one of the platform providers earns more profits than in any
equilibrium that arises when platforms are compatible.
We now proceed to investigate whether there are asymmetric equilibria under incompat-
ibility that may be preferred by (at least) one platform provider over all equilibria in the
compatible case. We first consider the case of homogenous users (t = 0) and then extend the
analysis to the less tractable case of heterogeneous users (0 < t < 2/3). We will find that
the only equilibrium under compatibility is the symmetric equilibrium derived in Section 3,
and that asymmetric equilibria with one platform cornering the market exist in the case of
incompatible platforms. Moreover, market dominance by an incompatible platform leads to
higher profits than compatibility when horizontal differences between platforms t are low.
Note that the importance of studying asymmetric equilibria is reinforced by the fact that
in the incompatible case, symmetric equilibria do not exist when t is low. In particular,
the requirement that
(a− bc)2
2b
≥ Z ′ for a symmetric equilibrium to exist (see Proposition
3) becomes unrealistically severe as t ↓ 0, since the right hand side of the inequality grows
without bound as t decreases (for positive f + cD). This suggests that asymmetric equilibria
with a dominant platform may be the proper benchmark when making comparisons between
incompatibility and compatibility when t is low.
5.1 Homogeneous users (t = 0)
5.1.1 Asymmetric equilibria when platforms are compatible
We begin with a general development that will also be helpful for the case t > 0 (covered in
Section 5.2) and later specialize it to t = 0.
An asymmetric equilibrium under compatibility must involve platform providers charging
different prices to developers. This implies that one of the platforms must be making a loss
on the developer side (otherwise, the rival would undercut it). Suppose, without loss of
generality, that platform 1 is charging pD1 < c
D and pD1 < p
D
2 . In this case, platform 2’s
profits are
Π2(p
U
2 ) = p
U
2 (1− x(pU1 , pU2 )),
23We have also performed many numerical simulations with f + cD > 0, and we have found no counterex-
ample to this claim. See Figure 3. The Mathematica code is available from the authors.
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where, using (4) and (5), x(pU1 , p
U
2 ) is implicitly given by:
x(pU1 , p
U
2 )−
1
2
− b(p
U
2 − pU1 )
t(a− bc)2(1−
√
2b(f + pD1 )
[2− t+ 2tx(pU1 , pU2 )− 2t(x(pU1 , pU2 ))2](a− bc)2
)2
= 0.
In turn, platform 1’s profits are
Π1(p
U
1 , p
D
1 ) = p
U
1 x(p
U
1 , p
U
2 )+(p
D
1 − cD)(
√
[2− t+ 2tx(pU1 , pU2 )− 2t(x(pU1 , pU2 ))2](a− bc)2
2b(f + pD1 )
−1).
For simplicity, we will drop the arguments of x(pU1 , p
U
2 ), so that the free-entry condition
can be written as
N =
√
(2− t+ 2tx− 2tx2)(a− bc)2
2b(f + pD1 )
− 1, (17)
and the marginal user condition can be written as
x =
1
2
+
b(pU2 − pU1 )
t(a− bc)2
(
N + 1
N
)2
, (18)
with
∂x(pU1 , p
U
2 )
∂pU1
= − 1
t(a− bc)2N2
b(N + 1)2
+
2t(a− bc)2(1− 2x)(pU2 − pU1 )
2b(f + pD1 )(N + 1)
2N
,
∂x(pU1 , p
U
2 )
∂pD1
=
b(pU2 − pU1 )(N + 1)2
t(a− bc)2(f + pD1 )N3 + t(a− bc)2(1− 2x)(pU2 − pU1 )
.
After some manipulations and noting that ∂x(pU1 , p
U
2 )/∂p
U
2 = −∂x(pU1 , pU2 )/∂pU1 , the first-
order conditions for pU2 , p
U
1 , and p
D
1 can be written, respectively, as:
0 = (1− x)(t(a− bc)
2N2
b(N + 1)2
+
2t(a− bc)2(1− 2x)(pU2 − pU1 )
2b(f + pD1 )(N + 1)
2N
)− pU2 , (19)
0 = x(
t(a− bc)2N2
b(N + 1)2
+
2t(a− bc)2(1− 2x)(pU2 − pU1 )
2b(f + pD1 )(N + 1)
2N
)− (pU1 +
t(a− bc)2(1− 2x)(pD1 − cD)
2b(N + 1)(f + pD1 )
),
(20)
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0 = (pU1 +
t(a− bc)2(1− 2x)(pD1 − cD)
2b(N + 1)(f + pD1 )
)b(pU2 − pU1 )(N + 1)2 + (21)
[t(a− bc)2(f + pD1 )N3 + t(a− bc)2(1− 2x)(pU2 − pU1 )](N −
(pD1 − cD)(N + 1)
2(f + pD1 )
).
Thus, a necessary condition for an asymmetric equilibrium (pU1 , p
D
1 , p
U
2 , p
D
2 , x, and N)
with pD1 < c
D and pD1 < p
D
2 to exist is that the system of five equations formed by (17)-(21)
be satisfied.
To see that there is no asymmetric equilibrium, note that when t = 0, equations (19) and
(20) become 0 = pU2 and 0 = p
U
1 . Therefore, platform provider 1 would prefer to raise p
D
1
(since the right hand side of (21) would be always positive). We conclude that when t = 0
the unique equilibrium of the game is the symmetric equilibrium derived in Section 3.
5.1.2 Asymmetric equilibria when platforms are incompatible
When t = 0, compatibility yields zero profits for both providers. We now show that there
exists an equilibrium under incompatibility in which one platform provider dominates the
market and makes positive profits. The importance of asymmetric equilibria has already
been highlighted by Katz and Shapiro’s (1985) classical work on one-sided platforms, and
more recently, by Caillaud and Jullien (2003) in a setting in which both sides of the plat-
form bargain efficiently, unlike ours in which second-period trade efficiency depends on the
platform providers’ first-period pricing structures.
Let {pUi , pDi }2i=1 denote a candidate equilibrium strategy profile such that platform provider
1 corners the market. In this case, not only should users derive positive utility by purchasing
platform 1, but they should also prefer trading with 1 rather than 2. Hence, we must have
that
n21
2b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
− pU1 ≥ −pU2 ,
where n1 is given by the free-entry condition: p
D
1 =
1
b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
− f .
We focus throughout on the most optimistic expectations for the dominant platform (i.e.,
platform 1). Thus, upon observing any pair of access prices charged by a platform, it holds
that a user expects all others to join platform 1 unless pU2 ≤ p˜U2 = pU1 −
n1
2b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
, in
which case they all coordinate on platform 2 (since getting access to 1 is dominated). We
study the most profitable deviation that platform provider 2 could undertake. In order to
avoid infinite losses that would ensue from trying to attract developers, it can only deviate
by setting a price for users such that it attracts them all. This can be done by charging
26
a price (slightly below) p˜U2 = p
U
1 −
n21
2b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
< 0. Simultaneously, platform provider
2 could set an entry fee p˜D2 such that
1
b
(
a− bc
n˜2 + 1
)2
− f − p˜D2 = max(0,−f − pD1 ), that is,
we must have p˜D2 =
1
b
(
a− bc
n˜2 + 1
)2
− f . To solve for the optimal number of developers to be
attracted, notice that
Π2(n˜2) = p˜
U
2 + (
1
b
(
a− bc
n˜2 + 1
)2
− f − cD)n˜2
attains its maximum at some n˜2 ∈ (0, 1), so accounting for the integer constraint yields that
either n˜2 = 1 or n˜2 = 0. This shows that the optimal deviation for platform provider 2
would yield the following profits:
Π˜2 = p
U
1 −
n21
2b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
+ max(0,
(a− bc)2
4b
− f − cD).
Therefore, in order for (pU1 , p
D
1 ) to constitute an equilibrium strategy for platform provider
1, pU1 and n1 should be the solutions to the following programme (as long as profits are
positive in equilibrium):
maxepU1 ,en1 Π1(p˜
U
1 , n˜1) = maxepU1 ,en1[p˜
U
1 + (
1
b
(
a− bc
n˜1 + 1
)2
− f − cD)n˜1]
s.t. p˜U1 ≤
n˜21
2b
(
a− bc
n˜1 + 1
)2
+ min(0, f + cD − (a− bc)
2
4b
)
p˜U1 ≤
n˜21
2b
(
a− bc
n˜1 + 1
)2
.
The first constraint says that platform provider 1 sets a price for users such that 2 cannot
make positive profit, whereas the second one means that application users find it optimal to
trade with platform provider 1 at such prices, given that n˜1 developers are attracted. The
first constraint is more stringent than the second one if and only if
(a− bc)2
4b
≥ f + cD. If
this holds,
(a− bc)2
4b
− (f + cD) represents the benefit that accrues to users owing to the
existence of an (inactive) platform provider. This is at the expense of the dominant platform
provider, which loses some market power owing to the existence of potential competition.
Because the most interesting cases from a strategic standpoint are those in which the
dominant platform provider would be constrained by the existence of its competitor, we
27
assume that
(a− bc)2
4b
≥ f + cD and we can ignore the second constraint. Clearly, the first
constraint must be satisfied with equality in equilibrium, so platform provider 1 solves:
maxen1 Π1(n˜1) = maxen1 [
(a− bc)2
2b
(1− 1
(n˜1 + 1)2
)− (f + cD)n˜1 + f + cD − (a− bc)
2
4b
].
Hence, the optimal number of developers pursued by platform provider 1 is n˜∗1 =
(
(a− bc)2
b(f + cD)
) 1
3
−
1, and Π1(n˜
∗
1) ≥ Π1(1) > 0.
It can also be shown that users may be subsidized by the dominant platform provider.
Some algebra yields that
p˜∗1 =
(a− bc)2
4b
− 2(a− bc)
(
(a− bc)b(f + cD)) 13
2b
+
(
(a− bc)b(f + cD)) 23
2b
+ (f + cD).
Taking into account that
(a− bc)2
b(f + cD)
≥ 4, it can be shown that buyers are subsidized if and
only if it holds that 8 ≤ (a− bc)
2
b(f + cD)
≤ 4
3
√
3− 5. For low values of (a − bc)
2/b(f + cD), it is
pointless for the dominant platform provider to subsidize users since the low surplus that
could be extracted by the competing platform provider via developers would not compensate
the losses it would make when attracting users. This changes as the surplus grows, so the
dominant platform provider prices the competitor out by subsidizing users. However, for
large enough surplus, users are not subsidized.
5.1.3 Profit comparison
Because the unique equilibrium when platforms are compatible is the symmetric one derived
in Section 3 and profits in that equilibrium vanish as t ↓ 0, we have proved the following:
Proposition 5 Suppose there exist two competing platform providers that sell incompatible
platforms. If t = 0, there exist (two) asymmetric equilibria in which one of the platform
providers captures all users and achieves a positive profit that exceeds that achieved when
platforms are compatible. Moreover, users are subsidized by the dominant platform provider
if and only if 8 ≤ (a− bc)
2
b(f + cD)
≤ 4
3
√
3− 5 .
The striking result that platform compatibility yields greater profits than incompatibility
in a symmetric equilibrium is highly dependent on the type of equilibrium played. Indeed,
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asymmetric equilibria when platforms are incompatible may yield greater profits for the
dominant platform provider, as we just showed.
5.1.4 Social efficiency
We now compare social efficiency between competing platforms when they are compatible
and when they are incompatible and play the asymmetric equilibrium derived in Section
5.1.2. We begin with a simple remark.
Remark 2 Assume that t = 0 and suppose there exist two competing platform providers.
(a) If platforms are compatible, then total welfare in the unique equilibrium is
W com (N∗) =
(a− bc)2
2b
(
1− 1
(N∗ + 1)2
)
− (f + cD)N∗.
(b) If platforms are incompatible, then total welfare in the cornering equilibrium derived in
Section 5.1.2 is
W˜ inc (n˜∗1) =
(a− bc)2
2b
(
1− 1
(n˜∗1 + 1)2
)
− (f + cD)n˜∗1.
N∗ and n˜∗1 are the equilibrium number of developers in each case.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now, because n˜∗1 =
(
(a− bc)2
b(f + cD)
) 1
3
− 1 (see Section 5.1.2) and N∗ =
(
(a− bc)2
b(f + cD)
) 1
2
− 1
(see Section 3), simple algebra shows that W˜ inc (n˜∗1) > W
com (N∗). Therefore, when t = 0
the asymmetric equilibrium under incompatibility generates larger welfare than the unique
equilibrium under compatibility.
The advantage of compatibility versus asymmetric incompatibility is that it addresses
better the idiosyncratic tastes of users (horizontal dimension) because both platforms are
active and each serves half of the market. In the asymmetric equilibrium, only one platform
is active and those users located far away derive limited utility from applications on that
platform. We will show that the advantage of compatibility lessens as t declines. The
disadvantage of compatibility is that it induces too much entry by developers. The excessive
entry is independent of horizontal differentiation because pD∗ = cD regardless of the value
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of t. Therefore, when t = 0, asymmetric incompatibility has no disadvantage compared to
compatibility and thus the social welfare that it generates is larger.
5.2 Heterogeneous users (t > 0)
5.2.1 Asymmetric equilibria when platforms are compatible
As argued in Section 5.1.1, when studying asymmetric equilibria with compatibility, we may
(without loss of generality) consider the case where platform 1 charges pD1 < c
D and pD1 < p
D
2 .
Moreover, a necessary condition for an asymmetric equilibrium to exist is that the system
of five equations formed by (17)-(21) and five unknowns (pU1 , p
D
1 , p
U
2 , x, and N) be satisfied.
Given the difficulty of solving that system algebraically, we have performed a large volume
of numeric simulations.24 The simulations all suggest that there is no asymmetric equilibrium
in the case of compatible platforms (if one requires that N be larger than or equal to 1
when solving the system of equations). Intuitively, because compatibility prevents platforms
from differentiating based on the number of applications that run on them, given N and
the assumption that of symmetric horizontal differentiation between platforms, the prices
charged to users have a strong propensity to equalization. But when pU1 = p
U
2 , platform
1 prefers to increase pD1 to stop hemorrhaging losses on the developer side that are not
compensated by additional gains on the user side.
5.2.2 Asymmetric equilibria when platforms are incompatible
We now generalize the development in Section 5.1.2 to the case t > 0.
Suppose that {(pUi , pDi )}2i=1 is such that platform 1 completely dominates the market.
What is the most profitable deviation that platform 2 could undertake? To capture x2
users, it should charge a price pU2 such that
(1− t(1− x2))n21
2b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
− pU1 < −pU2 , that
is, p˜U2 = p
U
1 −
(1− t(1− x2))n21
2b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
. Using the free-entry condition for developers
yields that platform 2’s most profitable deviation is given by the solution to the following
programme:
max
x2,n2
x2(p
U
1 −
(1− t(1− x2))(a− bc)2
2b
(
n1
n1 + 1
)2
)+n2(
x2(2− tx2)(a− bc)2
2b
(
1
n2 + 1
)2
−(f+cD)).
24The Mathematica code is available from the authors.
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The first-order conditions are
(1− tx2)(a− bc)2n2
b
(
1
n2 + 1
)2
+ pU1 −
(1− t+ 2tx2)(a− bc)2
2b
(
n1
n1 + 1
)2
= 0
x2(2− tx2)(a− bc)2(1− n2)
2b(n2 + 1)3
− (f + cD)n2 = 0.
The second first-order condition, together with the integer constraint, implies that plat-
form 2 finds it optimal to promote either no entry or entry by just one developer. If
it finds it optimal to promote entry by one developer, then it chooses to serve x2 =
1− 2(1− t)
(
n1
n1 + 1
)2
+
4bpU1
(a− bc)2
t(1 + 4
(
n1
n1 + 1
)2
)
users. Note that x2 > 0 if and only if
pU1 >
(a− bc)2(2(1− t)
(
n1
n1 + 1
)2
− 1)
4b
=
(a− bc)2(2(1− t)
(
1−
√
2b(pD1 +f)
(2−t)(a−bc)2
)2
− 1)
4b
.
If x2 > 0, then profit is
x2(p
U
1 −
(1− t(1− x2))(a− bc)2
2b
(
n1
n1 + 1
)2
) +
x2(2− tx2)(a− bc)2
8b
− (f + cD)
Therefore, the equilibrium pU1 and p
D
1 solve the following constrained optimization pro-
gram:
max
pU1 ,p
D
1
pU1 + (p
D
1 − cD)(
√
(2− t)(a− bc)2
2b(pD1 + f)
− 1)
s.t. x2(p
U
1 −
(1− t(1− x2))(a− bc)2
2b
(1−
√
2b(pD1 + f)
(2− t)(a− bc)2 )
2) +
x2(2− tx2)(a− bc)2
8b
− (f + cD) ≤ 0
pU1 ≤
(1− t)(a− bc)2
2b
(
n1
n1 + 1
)2
,
where x2 =
1− 2(1− t)(1−
√
2b(pD1 +f)
(2−t)(a−bc)2 )
2 +
4bpU1
(a−bc)2
t(1 + 4(1−
√
2b(pD1 +f)
(2−t)(a−bc)2 )
2)
and n1 =
√
(2− t)(a− bc)2
2b(pD1 + f)
− 1.
The first constraint prevents platform 2 from deviating from a situation where it obtains
no demand. The second constraint guarantees that all users purchase platform 1.
31
5.2.3 Profit comparison
While the constrained optimization problem that we have just set up is hard to solve in
general, numerical analysis is manageable.25 The simulations (Figure 3) show that when t is
low, the dominant platform earns larger profits than symmetric platforms under compatibil-
ity. When t is low, the equilibrium under compatibility displays very intense competition for
users (in addition to the Bertrand-type competition for developers discussed in Section 3),
as the platforms are symmetric and scarcely differentiated. In the asymmetric incompatible
case, the winning platform needs to lower prices to attract buyers that are “far away” but,
since t is low, the lack of platform appeal for which they need to be compensated is also low.
The optimistic expectations towards the winning platform allow it to vertically differentiate
its offering based on the number of applications that it offers. The vertical differentiation,
in turn, allows for relatively large access prices and high profit.
As t grows and horizontal differentiation intensifies, it becomes harder for the dominant
platform to attract all users. This forces the dominant platform to lower pU and profits
decline. In fact, Figure 3 shows that when t is large, dominant platform equilibria may
generate lower profits than the symmetric equilibrium under incompatibility.
Incompatibility – 
Cornering equilibrium 
dominant firm profits 
Compatibility – Unique 
equilibrium 
Incompatibility – 
Symmetric equilibrium 
Figure 3: Profit comparison. Parameters: (a−bc)
2
2b
= 50, cD = 0.1, and f = 0.
We also note that if side payments were feasible, one necessary condition for platforms to
agree on compatibility through bargaining would be that industry profits under compatibility
exceeded the profits of the dominant platform under incompatibility. Figure 3 shows that
when t is low, dominant platform profits are more than twice the profits under compatibility.
25The Mathematica code is available from the authors. The figure shows profits under compatibility,
symmetric incompatibility, and asymmetric incompatibility at different values of t ∈ [0, 2/3).
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Therefore, when t is low it is impossible for platforms to agree on compatibility.
Figure 3 is also useful in extending the conclusions of our model to those situations in
which compatibility softens the horizontal differentiation of competing platforms because
of standardization. Thus, if platforms are allowed to switch from compatibility to incom-
patibility (or vice versa), there are typically two distinct effects on the nature of platform
competition. First, the size of the relevant network changes and, thus, the equilibrium prices
also change (this has been the issue that we have investigated in this paper). Second, t may
also change in value in the case of platform standardization. In particular, t is likely to be
lower when platforms are compatible. By fixing the value of t in our analysis, we have been
able to isolate the first effect to better understand it.
While future research may carefully address the issue of changing t, based on Figure 3 we
can safely conclude that small changes in t have no qualitative effects on our results. To see
this, note that a decrease in t for the compatible case is equivalent to a rotation downwards
of the compatible profit line from the origin. If there were large changes in t, however, then
profits under symmetric incompatibility may be larger than under compatibility, reversing
one of our main results.
5.2.4 Social efficiency
We now compare social efficiency between competing platforms when they are compatible,
when they are incompatible and play the unique symmetric equilibrium derived in Section
4, and when they are incompatible and play the asymmetric equilibrium derived in Section
5.2.2. The following is a generalization of Remark 2 to the cases with t > 0.
Remark 3 Let A =
(a− bc)2
2b
. Suppose there exist two competing platform providers.
(a) If platforms are compatible, then total welfare in the unique equilibrium is
W com (N∗) = (1− t
4
)A
(
1− 1
(N∗ + 1)2
)
− (f + cD)N∗.
(b) If platforms are incompatible, then total welfare in the unique symmetric equilibrium is
W inc (n∗∗) = (1− t
4
)A
(
1− 1
(n∗∗ + 1)2
)
− 2(f + cD)n∗∗.
(c) If platforms are incompatible, then total welfare in the cornering equilibrium derived in
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Section 5.2.2 is
W˜ inc (n˜∗1) = (1−
t
2
)A
(
1− 1
(n˜∗1 + 1)2
)
− (f + cD)n˜∗1.
N∗, n∗∗, and n˜∗1 are the equilibrium number of developers in each case.
Proof. See Appendix.
Because both n∗∗ and n˜∗1 depend on p
D∗∗ and p˜D1 for which we do not have explicit
solutions, we proceed to compare W com (N∗), W inc (n∗∗), and W˜ inc (n˜∗1) through numerical
simulations.26 The examples reveal that the comparison is ambiguous (see Figures 4 and 5
below). When t is low, there is no symmetric incompatible equilibrium. In this case, the
asymmetric incompatible equilibrium appears to generate larger surplus than compatibility.
The intuition is exactly as presented in Section 5.1.4.
We also see that symmetric incompatibility may produce larger social surplus than com-
patibility. While compatibility saves on costs to build a given network of developers, it leads
to excessive entry.
Finally, the simulations show that welfare is a decreasing function of t, regardless of
the intellectual property regime and equilibrium considered. As the intensity of preferences
grows, users experience increased disutility from purchasing a platform that is not exactly
of their liking.
! 
W
com
! 
W
inc
! 
˜ W 
inc
Figure 4: Total welfare comparison. Parameters: (a−bc)
2
2b
= 50, cD = 0.1, and f = 0.
26The Mathematica code is available from the authors.
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Figure 5: Total welfare comparison. Parameters: (a−bc)
2
2b
= 1000, cD = 0.1, and f = 0.
6 Conclusion
We have studied price competition between providers of two-sided platforms in a setting
where the two sides first pay a price to gain access to the functionalities of a platform and
then interact with each other under oligopolistic conditions. The paper provides a theory
for why firms may choose to make their platforms incompatible, despite the softer price
competition for users that ensues under compatibility. Incompatibility might lead to market
dominance and high profits by one of the platform providers, even if they are both ex ante
identical and there are not fixed costs of operation. We have also shown that symmetric and
asymmetric equilibria under incompatibility may exhibit user subsidization in order to spur
developer entry, a result that seems in line with analysts’ observations in many markets with
two-sided platforms. Finally, we have shown that platform competition results in socially
insufficient (excessive) developer entry under incompatibility (compatibility).
One limitation of our approach is that we did not allow platform providers to charge
royalty fees per unit of output sold to developers (in addition to the fixed access fee pDi ).
There is a strong incentive in our model to set such royalties below zero. On the one hand,
incompatible platforms partly internalize the effects of imperfect competition downstream.
Therefore, they will want to distort second-period trade as little as possible. Negative roy-
alty fees would move such trade closer to efficiency. Compatible platforms, on the other
hand, are likely to set royalty fees below zero for strategic rather than efficiency reasons.27
Negative royalties would allow developers which traded with a given platform provider to
27We are implicitly assuming that both types of agents trade with a platform provider simultaneously so
as to focus on the strategic or efficiency reasons why platform providers may want to keep royalties low. We
are cognizant that this sidesteps the remarkable result by Hagiu (2006a) that platform providers may wish
to use royalty fees to alleviate a hold-up problem when developers decide whether or not to trade with a
platform provider before users do.
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become tougher competitors in the second period, which would boost profits on the de-
veloper side because trade by developers with the competing platform provider would be
discouraged. This effect would be reversed if second-period competition displayed strategic
complementarity.
A second shortcoming of our approach is the assumption that products sold by developers
are homogeneous. Allowing for product differentiation would introduce an additional incen-
tive for the platform provider/s to promote developer entry. By doing so, developers could
better address users’ tastes, and hence the platform provider/s could extract the increase in
developer profits and user utility by raising license/entry fees and the price charged to users
for the platform. However, the main insights regarding the relative advantages of compati-
bility vs. incompatibility and social efficiency are likely to be qualitatively unaffected.
Perhaps a more important limitation is our focus on the cases in which compatibility
requires all platform providers to agree. This may be representative for technological stan-
dards, but in several contexts, a platform can be made compatible with another one by means
of an adapter. It would be interesting to examine the situations in which the developers for
one of the platforms can sell applications to users of both platforms, but the developers
for the competing platform can sell applications only to users of their platform. Although
technically challenging, analyzing the private and social incentives for partial compatibility
seems an important avenue for future research on compatibility in markets with two-sided
platforms.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Letting
H(x) ≡
2(1− tx)2(a− bc−
√
2b(pD1 +f)
x(2−tx) )
√
2b(pD1 +f)
[x(2−tx)]3 − t(a− bc−
√
2b(pD1 +f)
x(2−tx) )
2
2b
+
2(1 + tx− t)2(a− bc−
√
2b(pD2 +f)
(1−x)(2−t(1−x)))
√
2b(pD2 +f)
[(1−x)(2−t(1−x))]3 − t(a− bc−
√
2b(pD2 +f)
(1−x)(2−t(1−x)))
2
2b
,
we have that the implicit function theorem applied on (14) yields
∂x(pU1 , p
D
1 )
∂pU1
=
1
H(x)
(22)
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and
∂x(pU1 , p
D
1 )
∂pD1
=
(1− tx)(a− bc)√
2bx(2− tx)(pD1 + f)
− (1− tx)
x(2− tx)
H(x)
. (23)
Given that we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria in which x =
1
2
, pU1 = p
U
2 ≡ pU
and pD1 = p
D
2 ≡ pD, the first-order conditions (15) and (16) can be simplified with the aid of
expressions (22) and (23) so as to get:
1
2
=
2b(pU +
(pD − cD)(a− bc)(2− t)√
2b(pD + f)(4− t) )
2t(a− bc−
√
8b(pD + f)
4− t )
2 − 4(2− t)
2
4− t (a− bc−
√
8b(pD + f)
4− t )
√
8b(pD + f)
4− t
(24)
and
2b(pU + (p
D−cD)(a−bc)(2−t)√
2b(pD+f)(4−t) )(
(2−t)(a−bc)√
2b(4−t)(pD+f) −
2(2−t)
4−t )
4(2−t)2
4−t (a− bc−
√
8b(pD+f)
(4−t) )
√
8b(pD+f)
4−t − 2t(a− bc−
√
8b(pD+f)
4−t )
2
− (p
D − cD)(a− bc)√4− t
4
√
2b(pD + f)3
=
(25)
1− (a− bc)
√
4− t
2
√
2b(pD + f)
.
Plugging equation (24) into (25) yields
(a− bc)√4− t
8
(
4(f + cD) + t(pD − cD)√
2b(pD + f)3
) = 1, (26)
whence it is relatively simple to show that there exists a unique value of pD that solves
such equation.28 Denoting such a value of pD by pD∗∗, note that pD∗∗ > cD if and only if
(a− bc)2
2b
>
4(f + cD)
4− t holds.
Using (24) and (26), we can find the price pU∗∗ charged to users in equilibrium by per-
28Letting g(pD) ≡ (a− bc)
√
4− t
8
(
4(f + cD) + t(pD − cD)√
2b(pD + f)3
) in expression (26), the result follows because
g(−f) =∞, g(∞) = 0 and g′ < 0 (since t < 2
3
< 4).
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forming some algebra:
pU∗∗ =
4t(4 + 2t− t2)(pD∗∗ + f)(pD∗∗ − cD)2 − 32(2− t)(3− t)(f + cD)(pD∗∗ + f)(pD∗∗ − cD)
(4− t)[4(f + cD) + t(pD∗∗ − cD)]2 .
(27)
In order for both platform providers charging a pair of prices (pU∗∗, pD∗∗) to constitute
an equilibrium, the values of the parameter space should be such that some conditions hold.
Thus, the marginal user (i.e., the one located at the middle of the segment) should attain a
positive utility, platform providers should make positive profits and a unilateral increase in
the user access fee should not increase user demand for the platform that raises such price (as
required by the monotonicity refinement). We proceed to derive the parameter restrictions
implied by each of these equilibrium conditions.
First, observe that the marginal user attains a positive utility if and only if uincbj (1/2) >
pU∗∗. Because uincbj (1/2) =
(2− t)(a− bc−
√
8b(pD∗∗ + f)
4− t )
2
4b
, expression (26) implies that
this condition is equivalent to the following one:
2(2− t)(4− t)(pD∗∗ − cD)2(pD∗∗ + f)
[4(f + cD) + t(pD∗∗ − cD)]2 > p
U∗∗.
Making use of (27), we have that this inequality is satisfied if and only if the following holds:
(t3 + 6t2 − 40t+ 32)(pD∗∗ − cD)2 + 16(2− t)(3− t)(f + cD)(pD∗∗ − cD) > 0.
The left hand side is strictly convex in pD∗∗ (since t < 2/3) and takes a negative value for
pD∗∗ = −f (which clearly is the smallest admissible value of pD∗∗), so it follows that the
marginal user makes a positive utility in equilibrium if and only if pD∗∗ > cD, that is, if
and only if
(a− bc)2
2b
>
4(f + cD)
4− t is satisfied. Hence, the parameter constraint that users
attain a positive utility implies that developers are not subsidized to enter the market in a
symmetric equilibrium with incompatible platforms.
Second, we study the conditions under which platform providers make non-negative prof-
its in a symmetric equilibrium. Profits made by each of them are equal to
Π∗∗1 = Π
∗∗
2 ≡ Π∗∗ =
pU∗∗
2
+ (pD∗∗ − cD)( (a− bc)
√
4− t
2
√
2b(pD∗∗ + f)
− 1).
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By (27) and (26), we have
Π∗∗ =
(pD∗∗ − cD)
(4− t)[4(f + cD) + t(pD∗∗ − cD)]2 [2t(4 + 2t− t
2)(pD∗∗ + f)(pD∗∗ − cD)−
16(2− t)(3− t)(f + cD)(pD∗∗ + f) + 4(4− t)2(f + cD)(pD∗∗ − cD) + t(4− t)2(pD∗∗ − cD)2],
so note that Π∗∗ ≥ 0 if and only if h(pD∗∗) ≥ 0, where
h(pD∗∗) ≡ t(24− 4t− t2)(pD∗∗ − cD)2 + 2(4t2 − t3 + 32− 12t)(pD∗∗ − cD)(f + cD)−
16(2− t)(3− t)(pD∗∗ + f)(f + cD).
Because h′′ > 0 and h(−f) < 0, it follows that h(pD∗∗) ≥ 0 for sufficiently large pD∗∗, or
equivalently, for large enough
(a− bc)2
2b
. Let us refer to such a value of
(a− bc)2
2b
as W .29
Because h(cD) < 0, the condition that equilibrium profit is positive is more stringent than
the one that makes the utility of the marginal user positive (which simply requires that
pD∗∗ > cD), so W >
4(f + cD)
4− t .
The final condition that must hold in a symmetric equilibrium is the monotonicity con-
dition, which requires that ∂x(pU1 , p
D
1 )/∂p
U
1 < 0 and ∂x(p
U
1 , p
D
1 )/∂p
D
1 < 0 both hold at the
equilibrium prices. It is easy to prove that both ∂x(pU1 , p
D
1 )/∂p
U
1 and ∂x(p
U
1 , p
D
1 )/∂p
D
1 always
have the same sign at the symmetric equilibrium prices. Also, equation (15) implies that
∂x(pU1 , p
D
1 )/∂p
U
1 < 0 (evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium prices) if and only if
pU1 +
(pD1 − cD)(a− bc)(1− tx(pU1 , pD1 ))√
2b(pD1 + f)x(p
U
1 , p
D
1 )(2− tx(pU1 , pD1 ))
> 0. (28)
Using expressions (26) and (27) implies that the condition in (28) is equivalent to the fol-
29It is straightforward to show that the smallest value of pD∗∗ that makes profits non-negative is cD +
w(f + cD), where
w =
2(t3 + 4t2 − 28t+ 16) +√(t3 + 4t2 − 28t+ 16)2 + 64t(2− t)(3− t)(24− 4t− t2)
2t(24− 4t− t2) .
The lower bound on
(a− bc)2
2b
can be obtained by using this value for pD in equation (26), whence we have
that the following condition should hold:
(a− bc)2
2b
≥ 64(1 + w)
3(f + cD)
(4− t)(4 + tw)2 ≡W .
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lowing one:
4t(4− t2 + 4)(pD∗∗ + f)(pD∗∗ − cD)2 − 32(2− t)2(f + cD)(pD∗∗ − cD)(pD∗∗ + f)
(4− t)[4(f + cD) + t(pD∗∗ − cD)]2 > 0.
Therefore, the monotonicity requirement boils down to assuming that pD∗∗ > cD+
8(2− t)2(f + cD)
t(8− t2) ,
which can be shown to directly satisfy the non-negativity constraint on equilibrium prof-
its for t < 2/3 (since h(cD +
8(2− t)2(f + cD)
t(8− t2) ) > 0). Note by (26) that p
D∗∗ ≥ cD +
8(2− t)2(f + cD)
t(8− t2) if and only if
(a− bc)2
2b
≥ Z ′ ≡ 4(f + c
D)(32 + 8t2 − 24t− t3)3
t3(8− t2)(4− t)5 .
To conclude the proof, we examine the conditions under which users of applications may
be subsidized when trading with a platform provider. Observe that expression (27) and the
fact that pD∗∗ > cD together imply that pU∗∗ ≤ 0 if and only if
t(4 + 2t− t2)(pD∗∗ − cD)− 8(2− t)(3− t)(f + cD) ≤ 0,
that is, users are subsidized in equilibrium if and only if the following inequality holds:
pD∗∗ ≤ cD + 8(2− t)(3− t)(f + c
D)
t(4 + 2t− t2) .
Letting pD = cD +
8(2− t)(3− t)(f + cD)
t(4 + 2t− t2) in the left hand side of expression (26) yields
(a− bc)√4− t
8
(
4(f + cD) + 8(2−t)(3−t)(f+c
D)
(4+2t−t2)√
2b(f + cD + 8(2−t)(3−t)(f+c
D)
t(4+2t−t2) )
3
),
which is not larger than 1 for
(a− bc)2
2b
≤ 4(f + c
D)(t2 − 6t+ 12)3
(4− t)2t3(4 + 2t− t2) ≡ Z. This shows that
pU∗∗ ≤ 0 if and only if (a− bc)
2
2b
≤ Z. Because Z > Z ′ for t < 2/3, we have that users are
subsidized if
(a− bc)2
2b
∈ [Z ′, Z), whereas they are not subsidized if (a− bc)
2
2b
≥ Z.
Proof of Remark 1. We would like to see how many solutions (x, n1, n2) the following
system has:
(1− tx)n21
2b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
− pU = (1− t (1− x))n
2
2
2b
(
a− bc
n2 + 1
)2
− pU , (29)
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pD =
x (2− tx)
2b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
− f , (30)
pD =
(1− x) (2− t (1− x))
2b
(
a− bc
n2 + 1
)2
− f . (31)
Note that we are imposing symmetry (pU1 = p
U
2 = p
U and pD1 = p
D
2 = p
D) because we study
symmetric equilibria only.
Notice first that
x =
1
2
and n1 = n2 =
√
b (a− bc)2 (pD + f) (2− t
2
)
2b (pD + f)
− 1 (32)
is one solution. The question is whether there are asymmetric solutions (solutions with x 6= 1
2
and n1 6= n2).
We begin by working with equation (30) to obtain:(
pD + f
)
2b
x (2− tx) =
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
.
Likewise, equation (31) yields: (
pD + f
)
2b
(1− x) (2− t (1− x)) =
(
a− bc
n2 + 1
)2
.
Using these two expressions in (29), we have:
n1
n2
=
(
(1− t (1− x))x (2− tx)
(1− x) (2− t (1− x)) (1− tx)
) 1
2
. (33)
Now, solving for n1 in (30), and letting G ≡
√
2b
(
pD + f
)
(a− bc)2 , we obtain
n1 =
√
x (2− tx)
G
− 1. (34)
Likewise, using (31) we see that
n2 =
√
(1− x) (2− t (1− x))
G
− 1. (35)
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Using (34) and (35), we have
n1
n2
=
√
x (2− tx)−G√
(1− x) (2− t (1− x))−G . (36)
Letting
n1
n2
≡ y, we may write the system of two equations and two unknowns (x and y)
formed by (33) and (36) as follows:
y =
√
x (2− tx) (1− t (1− x))√
(1− x) (2− t (1− x)) (1− tx)
y =
√
x (2− tx)−G√
(1− x) (2− t (1− x))−G
. (37)
The pairs of y and x that solve this system (given values of the parameters) are also solutions
to the original system of equations.30 It is easy to see that x = 1
2
and y = 1 is a solution
regardless of the value of G. When x 6= 1
2
, the value of G becomes relevant. A simple change
of variables, however, confirms that the system is symmetric around x = 1
2
. Therefore, we
need only study the solutions for the case 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2
: if xˆ < 1
2
is part of a solution, then
1− xˆ > 1
2
is part of another solution.
We now equate both expressions and solve for G to obtain:
G =
√
(2− t (1− x)) (1− x)√x (2− tx)(√1− tx−√1− t (1− x))√
(2− t (1− x)) (1− x)√1− tx−√1− t (1− x)√x (2− tx) .
Define
Y (x) =
√
(2− t (1− x)) (1− x)√x (2− tx)(√1− tx−√1− t (1− x))√
(2− t (1− x)) (1− x)√1− tx−√1− t (1− x)√x (2− tx) ,
so that it holds that Y (x) = G. It is easy to show that (given t) Y (x) is strictly increasing
in x (over the range 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2
). Therefore, given t, the maximum G such that the system
(37) has a solution (other than for x =
1
2
in which case G is irrelevant) is
lim
x→ 1
2
Y (x) =
(4− t) 32 t
2 (8− 4t+ t2) .
30Because y is the ratio n1n2 , to recover the exact values of n1 and/or n2 we use (34) and (35).
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Therefore, the system has at least one more solution if and only if
G ≤ (4− t)
3
2 t
2 (8− 4t+ t2) .
We now show that when G ≤ (4− t)
3
2 t
2 (8− 4t+ t2) the system has only one solution with x <
1
2
.
We reason by contradiction. Suppose that there were more than one solution. Consider two
such solutions (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) with x1, x2 <
1
2
. Obviously, a necessary condition for
(x1, y1) and (x2, y2) to be different is that x1 6= x2. Assume, without loss of generality, that
x1 < x2 <
1
2
. At these values of x we must have that Y (x1) = G and Y (x2) = G but this is
impossible because Y (·) is strictly increasing in x (over the range 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2
). We conclude
that (37) has either one solution only (x =
1
2
, y = 1; this happens when G >
(4− t) 32 t
2 (8− 4t+ t2))
or it has three solutions (one with x =
1
2
, another one with x <
1
2
, and the symmetric
solution with x >
1
2
; this happens when G ≤ (4− t)
3
2 t
2 (8− 4t+ t2)).
Finally, we show that x =
1
2
satisfies the monotonicity criterion if and only if the system
has three solutions. We use the following expressions:
• Optimality condition for pD (see proof of Proposition 3)
(a− bc)√4− t
8
(
4(f + cD) + t(pD − cD)√
2b(pD + f)3
) = 1.
• Monotonicity condition for x = 1
2
(see proof of Proposition 3):
pD ≥ cD + 8(2− t)
2(f + cD)
t(8− t2) .
• Condition for the system to have three solutions (as derived above):
(4− t)3 t2
4 (8− 4t+ t2)2 ≥
2b
(
pD + f
)
(a− bc)2 .
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The optimality condition for pD can be written as
(4− t)
64
(
4(f + cD) + t(pD − cD))2
(pD + f)2
=
(
pD + f
)
2b
(a− bc)2 .
Therefore, we can rewrite the condition for the system to have three solutions as:
(4− t)3 t2
4 (8− 4t+ t2)2 ≥
(4− t)
64
(
4(f + cD) + t(pD − cD))2
(pD + f)2
(4− t)2 t2
(8− 4t+ t2)2 ≥
(
4(f + cD) + t(pD − cD))2
16(pD + f)2
4t (4− t)
(8− 4t+ t2) ≥
(
4(f + cD) + t(pD − cD))
(pD + f)
.
We would like to see that
4t (4− t)
(8− 4t+ t2) ≥
(
4(f + cD) + t(pD − cD))
(pD + f)
(38)
is satisfied when
pD ≥ cD + 8(2− t)
2(f + cD)
t(8− t2) . (39)
Given pD, cD, and f , let t∗ be the value of t such that both (38) and (39) are satisfied
with equality. (It is easy to see that this is the same t.)
We now show that as t increases from t∗, both (38) and (39) continue to be satisfied. To
see this, consider first (38). The derivative of the lhs with respect to t is
d
dt
(
4t (4− t)
(8− 4t+ t2)
)
=
64 (2− t)
(8− 4t+ t2)2 > 0.
The derivative of the rhs with respect to t is
d
dt
((
4(f + cD) + t(pD − cD))
(pD + f)
)
=
pD − cD
pD + f
> 0.
Because at t∗ (38) is satisfied with equality, we have that
4t∗ (4− t∗)
(8− 4t∗ + t∗2) =
(
4(f + cD) + t∗(pD∗ − cD))
(pD∗ + f)
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or (
8− 4t∗ + t∗2) = 4t∗ (4− t∗) (pD + f)
4(f + cD) + t∗(pD − cD) .
We use this expression to derive the following:
d
dt
(
4t (4− t)
(8− 4t+ t2)
)∣∣∣∣
t∗
=
64 (2− t∗)
(8− 4t∗ + t∗2)2 =
64 (2− t∗)
8− 4t∗ + t∗2
4(f + cD) + t∗(pD − cD)
4t∗ (4− t∗) (pD + f)
>
64 (2− t∗)
8− 4t∗ + t∗2
(pD − cD)
4 (4− t∗) (pD + f) =
64 (2− t∗)
4 (4− t∗) (8− 4t∗ + t∗2)
pD − cD
pD∗ + f
=
64 (2− t∗)
4 (4− t∗) (8− 4t∗ + t∗2)
d
dt
((
4(f + cD) + t(pD − cD))
(pD + f)
)∣∣∣∣∣
t∗
>
d
dt
((
4(f + cD) + t(pD − cD))
(pD + f)
)∣∣∣∣∣
t∗
.
The last inequality follows from
64 (2− t∗)
4 (4− t∗) (8− 4t∗ + t∗2) ≥ 1.
Therefore at t∗:
d
dt
(lhs) >
d
dt
(rhs) .
Finally, note that the second derivative of the lhs wrt to t is
d2
dt2
(lhs) =
64 (8− 3 (4− t) t)
(8− 4t+ t2)3 ,
which is positive for 0 ≤ t ≤ 2
3
, and note as well that d
2
dt2
(rhs) = 0. Therefore, as t grows
from t∗, (38) is satisfied.
Let’s now consider (39). The derivative of the rhs with respect to t is
d
dt
(
8(2− t)2(f + cD)
t(8− t2)
)
=
8(cD + f)(−32 + t2 (20− (8− t) t))
t2(8− t2)2 ,
which is less than zero for 0 ≤ t ≤ 2
3
. Therefore, as t grows from t∗, (39) becomes less and
less stringent.
Suppose now that the parameter values are such that the monotonicity condition for
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x =
1
2
hold. We must have
pD ≥ cD + 8(2− t)
2(f + cD)
t(8− t2) .
Now, reduce t so that this condition holds with equality (t must be reduced because the rhs
is decreasing in t; moreover, equality can always be attained because the limit of the rhs
as t ↓ 0 is ∞). At this point, the condition for the system to have three solutions is also
satisfied with equality. The above argument shows that at the original, higher, t we must
have that
4t (4− t)
(8− 4t+ t2) ≥
(
4(f + cD) + t(pD − cD))
(pD∗ + f)
and thus (38) is satisfied. We conclude that whenever the monotonicity condition for x =
1
2
holds, the system has three solutions. The same argument can be made to show that when
the system has three solutions, then the monotonicity condition for x =
1
2
holds.
Proof of Proposition 4. The left hand side of the expression in (26) for pD = pDe is
equal to 1 +
t
4
( 3
√
(4− t)(a− bc)2
8b(f + cD)
− 1), which exceeds 1 because it has been assumed that
(a− bc)2
2b
≥ Z ′ and we have shown in the proof of Proposition 1 that Z ′ > 4(f + c
D)
4− t , so
that inequality
(a− bc)2
2b
>
4(f + cD)
4− t is fulfilled. Therefore, it follows that p
De < pD∗, and
hence we have that ne > n∗∗. In addition, it is easy to see that pDe > cD because it holds
that
(a− bc)2
2b
>
4(f + cD)
(4− t) .
Proof of Remarks 2 and 3. The expressions for W com (N∗) and W inc (n∗∗) are derived
exactly as in Sections 3.1 and 4.1, respectively.
We obtain W˜ inc as follows. Under asymmetric incompatibility only platform 1 has users
and developers in equilibrium. Every developer who traded with platform 1 makes profits
p˜iinc1 =
x1(2− tx1)
2b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
.
Because the market is covered (x1 = 1), profits are:
p˜iinc1 =
(2− t)
2b
(
a− bc
n1 + 1
)2
= (2− t)A 1
(n1 + 1)
2 ,
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where A =
(a− bc)2
2b
.
Welfare under asymmetric incompatibility is:
W˜ inc =
∫ 1
0
(1− ts)A
(
n˜∗1
n˜∗1 + 1
)2
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
Users’ surplus
+
(
(2− t)A 1
(n˜∗1 + 1)
2 − f − cD
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Platform’s profits
n˜∗1
= (1− t
2
)A
(
1− 1
(n˜∗1 + 1)2
)
− (f + cD)n˜∗1.
The equilibrium number of developers n˜∗1 solves
p˜iinc1 − f − p˜D1 = 0
or
(2− t)A 1
(n˜∗1 + 1)
2 − f − p˜D1 = 0,
where p˜D1 is the solution to the constrained optimization programme presented in Section
5.2. Therefore,
n˜∗1 =
√
A (2− t)
f + p˜D1
− 1.
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